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Abstract 
Credit union strategy in developing countries focusses primarily on the savings mobilization 
first approach. By generating local resources, CUs like the ones in Niger have the ability to become 
one of the most important source of financial resource for farm household as well micro and small 
scale entrepreneurs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. History of the Credit Union Movement 
The World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), with headquarters in Madison, Wisconsin, 
is the worldwide representative organization of credit unions (CUs) and similar cooperative financial 
institutions. For its developing country members, e.g. Niger, WOCCU provides technical and 
development services, including the design and implementation of long-term programs in 
institutional development, short-term technical assistance and training projects, and assistance in 
mobilizing human and financial resources. 
WOCCU estimates that there are 37,078 CUs in the world, with a membership of more than 
88 million people, with a penetration rate of5.13 percent (WOCCU, 1994 statistical report). Savings 
are estimated at US $ 3 77.7 billion, loans at US $ 250 billion, reserves at US $13.8 billion and assets 
at US $ 418.4 billion. In developing countries, credit unions play a significant role in urban and rural 
financial markets where the majority of the population is not served by the formal sector. Credit 
union strategy in developing countries focusses primarily on the savings mobilization first approach 
whereby accumulated local savings is granted as loans to members-savers instead of relying on 
1 The authors are post-doctoral researchers and professor respectively at The Ohio State 
University, Department of Agricultural Economics, 2120 Fyffe Road, Columbus, Ohio, 43210-1066. 
Telephone: (614) 291-8014. Fax: (614) 292-7362. 
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outside funding. By generating local resources, CUs have the ability to become one of the most 
important source of fmancial resource for fann household as well micro and small scale 
entrepreneurs. 
The primary objective of a credit union is to provide safe and efficient savings and loan 
services to its members at a reasonable cost. Credit unions are organized under rules and regulations 
that are fairly uniform wherever they exist. They are democratically-run institutions based on the 
principle of one-person, one-vote and have a common bond that link members. In open-bond or 
community based CUs, members are from the same community, village, or residence area. In 
occupational or closed-bond CUs, members belong to the same profession, or are engaged in the 
same occupation. 
Credit unions mobilize savings and provide loans to their members only. The member share 
of a CU is crucial in determining eligibility and size of loan. Credit union members have a right to 
a multiple of their share, frequently two to one (2:1). At times, deposit accounts in some CUs are 
used (in addition to shares) as the basis to establish the loan multiple. There is also usually a formal 
limit on the size of a single loan in a credit union. Managers of CUs are responsible for the day to 
day decisions, while the ultimate control of the organization belongs to the general assembly of 
members-owners. The owner-client structure of CUs can create conflicts among borrowers, savers, 
and management. Opposition among net borrowers and net savers for control of the institution can 
lead to a borrower-dominated or saver-dominated credit union. Individual's share capital cannot be 
traded or sold to others outside of the credit union. The member gets restitution of his/her shares 
upon resignation from the credit union. The return on share capital is quite limited in a credit union 
and most often, the organization pays dividends by distributing profits made by the institution to 
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members or in a form of interest rebates on loans. Credit unions place their excess liquidity with 
other financial institutions or with the Central Finance Facility (CFF) if one exists. Most often, the 
CFF is a federation of all credit unions in the system and plays the role of financial intermediary 
between surplus units and deficit units. The CFF lends directly to credit unions against a fee and is 
in charge of searching the best investment alternatives for the liquidity it manages. 
This study reviews the financial health of the credit union movement in Niger. It specifically 
reviews the theoretical framework of a CU and derives an empirical model for the Niger movement 
to test the elements behind its successful performance. 
2. Profile of the credit union movement in Niier 
In response to the lack of formal financial institutions outside of the main urban areas and 
given that rural households had to rely almost exclusively on informal financial intermediaries for 
financial services, WOCCU started a pilot project of CUs in Niger in 1990. The first three-and-a-half 
years of pilot phase, from 1989 to 1991, were used to develop and promote CUs in the Zinder 
department where 11 CUs were created during that period. In its current phase, the objective of the 
project funded by USAID is to promote and extend CU development in other departments such as 
Maradi, Niamey in addition to Zinder. One specific objective is to create 85 CPECs and reach 8,000 
members by August 1997, accumulate FCFA 119 million (US $148,000)2 in savings, and FCFA 74 
million (US $256,000) in loans, and FCFA 128 million (US $238,000) in assets. As of December 
1994, there were 37 CPECs in the departments ofMaradi, Niamey, Kollo and Tillabery. The project 
will continue to promote new CUs and provide support services to them, create a representative 
2 The exchange rate was US $1=FCFA 500 after the devaluation of the currency which 
occurred in January 1994. 
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body, and establish a service association staff and physical infrastructure that will be transferred to 
a national service association at an appropriate time. Credit Unions in Niger function according to 
the basic operating principles set out by WOCCU for all its affiliated organizations. Membership 
has been growing at more than a 100 percent per year and as of December 1994, there were 4838 
members (3293 men, 1486 women, and 59 institutional accounts). The movement had accumulated 
FCF A 88.4 million in savings deposits, and FCF A 130.2 million in assets, surpassing the target set 
for 1997. In the year 1995 alone, 1235loans were granted to 4838 members for a total amount of 
FCF A 93.3 million yielding an average loan size ofFCF A 75,000. Total loan outstanding was FCF A 
50.1 million in March 31, 1995 with an excellent recovery rate of nearly 100 percent. 
II. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF A CREDIT UNION 
Models of financial finn based on profit maximization cannot be readily applied to a CU 
principally because members of the CU are also the owners and the consumers of its output as well 
as the suppliers of its input. Thus, the CU has to intermediate between its member-savers and 
member-borrowers. That heterogeneity in the membership is an inherent source of conflict between 
CU members and standard theoretical models of cooperatives organizations do not address that issue. 
A theoretical framework that takes into account CUs' unique characteristics was finally developed 
by Smith, Cargil, and Meyer (1981). The model is based on two fundamental requirements. First, 
the specification of the objective function that focusses on the value ofCU participation to members. 
Second, the analysis explicitly considers the possibility of conflict among members, and the 
resolution of that conflict being a preference to either the borrowers or savers. Smith et al' s model 
is an extension of a previous work by Taylor (1971) and Flannery (1974) to show the different output 
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decisions for four behavioral motivations: profit maximization, borrower domination, saver 
domination, and neutrality. 
Under a riskless environment assumption, the generalized objective function is: 
A. NGL + o NGS + 1t (1) 
Subject to: 
A balance sheet constraint: 
L - S = D (2) 
A non-negative operating surplus constraint: 
(3) 
Linear specifications of loan demand and savings supply schedules are: 
a>O (4) 
s = PCr 8 -r su>• P>O (5) 
The Net Gain on Loans (NGL) is the value to the borrower and is represented by the 
difference between the CU loan rate, rL and the best alternative market rate, rLM• times the level of 
loan activity L. The Net Gain on Savings (NGS) is represented by the difference between the CU 
dividend rate on savings r8 , and the best alternative market rate available sM , times the level of 
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savings S. The weighting parameters A and a are used to deal with the issue of saver vs. borrower-
dominated as well as neutral credit union. 
Lis the level ofloans (L::::O), Sis the level of share deposits (S::::O), and D::::~ 0 is the level 
of debt issued ifL > S (e.g. borrowing from a central liquidity facility) or is the level of money 
market investment ifL < S. 
The nonnegative operating surplus (n) is what is available for distribution to members as an 
interest rebate on loans or a bonus dividend on savings. It takes into account the exogenous rate rDM 
which is assumed to be the same irrespective of whether D is a debt issue (D>O) or investment 
(D<O). The average cost of processing loans is Cv and Cs is the average cost of servicing savings 
accounts. Both costs are assumed to be constant. E is defmed as the sum of all fixed expenditures. 
This includes the cost of renting capital equipment, building space and any other costs associated 
with providing non-fmancial services to members. The linear specifications of loan demand schedule 
(4) and savings supply schedule (5) are used to complete the model. Equation (4) says that the 
quantity ofloans demanded is proportional to the spread between the CU loan rate, rL, and the best 
alternative market rate rLM· The market rates rLM• and rsM are exogenously determined. 
The CU chooses the optimal loan and dividend rates, rL· and r8*, to maximize a function of 
the total net gain available to its membership subject to the non-negative surplus constraint and 
balance sheet constraint. The model assumes that the parameters A and a are scaled such that their 
values fall between zero and one under the different cases of profit maximization, borrower 
domination, saver domination, and neutrality between borrower and saver interests. Smith et al. 
argue that there are good reasons to believe that a CU would usually adopt the equal treatment case, 
i.e., maximize the total gains to both borrowers and savers, especially if the membership is equally 
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distributed between savers and borrowers. Under Neutrality (A.= 1, a= 1), the CU's objective is 
to maximize the total gain to its borrowers and savers. The surplus is distributed equally between 
lower interest costs to borrower and higher dividend rates to savers. With a binding surplus 
constraint ( 1t*=O), the optimal rates are: 
(6) 
4E (7) 
In a neutral CU, savers will be paid a rate of interest on savings deposits that is higher than 
the rate paid in the profit maximizing CU, and borrowers will be paid a rate on loans that is lower 
than that of a profit maximizing CU. Also, the loan rate for a borrower oriented CU will be less than 
a neutral CU and the dividend rate will also be less than the one prevailing in a neutral CU. In a 
saver-dominated CU, both the loan rate and the dividend rate will be more than in a neutral CU. 
Thus, a borrower-dominated CU will issue more debt or invest less than if equal treatment were the 
norm; and a saver-oriented CU will issue less debt or invest more than in a neutral CU. 
Empirical test of the Smith et al. model by Patin and McNiel (1991) revealed that the 
majority of CUs in the USA exhibited relatively balanced behavior, although some CUs exhibited 
tendencies towards saver-dominated or borrower-oriented behavior. 
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lli. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL FOR THE NIGER CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT 
1. The Empirical Model and Data 
Application of Smith et al. theoretical framework is not always possible in developing 
countries where markets are fragmented and incomplete. Poyo (1986) tested a modified version of 
the Smith et al. model for the purpose of testing it in a developing country environment, i.e. 
Honduras. The purpose of empirically testing the behavior of a CU movement like the one in Niger 
is to find out which indicators of future fmancial stability would remain the same or change in the 
future as well as the direction of the change when it occurs. The following model for Niger CUs is 
an adaptation ofPoyo's (1986) model developed for CUs in Honduras itself derived from the Smith 
et al. theoretical framework and adapted to a developing country setting. Poyo estimated a 
simultaneous seven-equation model that included three savings supply equations, three price setting 
equations, and a loan rationing equation. Due to the nature of the Niger data and environment, the 
present empirical model will include only one savings supply equation and one loan rationing 
equation to be solved simultaneously in a system. The model derived below assumes that CUs in 
Niger operate in highly imperfect and fragmented fmancial markets. Access to formal financial 
services by the rural population is non-existent or limited at best. People in rural areas have to rely 
almost exclusively on the informal fmancial intermediaries of friends, relatives, money-keepers and 
money-lenders. The model is the following: 
T = a0 + a:1 LSRATIO + a:2 NLMB + a:3 MBSIZE + 0:4 FEMA1 
a5 RMARADI + a6 UMARADI + a:7 RZINDER + a:8 UZIND 
(8) 
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where the Greek characters «1, and p1, are the coefficients associated with each variable I, and € 1 are 
the error terms associated with each equation. The data is a cross-sectional time-series data (1990-
tTIO = Po + P1 SAMT + P2 NLMB + P3 MBSIZE + P4 INTRA". 
Ps AGE + P6 SALARYM + e2 (9) 
1994) obtained from WOCCU-Niger for all37 CPECs. Quarterly data were used for all quantitative 
variables used in the regression. 
2. Estimation Results 
The simultaneous two-equation model is estimated by the two-stage least square (2SLS) 
procedure using quarterly data available for all 3 7 credit unions since 1990 for the oldest CUs to one 
quarter for the three youngest CUs. There is a total of260 data points or observations. The variables 
used in the estimation are defined in table 1. The unbalanced nature of the cross-sectional time-
series data set makes the presence of autocorrelation very likely. However, attempts to correct for 
the suspected autocorrelation remained unsuccessful due to the small sample size for individual 
credit unions. A larger sample that includes an additionall2-20 quarters is needed to successfully 
use this procedure. A model with autocorrelation will still give unbiased estimators. 
The results of the simultaneous equation system are presented in tables 2 and 3 and show 
good individual R-squares and adjusted R-squares of 0.63 and 0.62, and 0.54 and 0.53, respectively, 
for the savings supply and loan rationing equations. All but one variable are significant in the 
savings supply equation, while all variables in the loan rationing equation are significant at either 
one or 10 percent level. The results of the savings supply equation in table 2 show that, as expected, 
the loan to savings ratio (LSRATIO), the average number ofloans per member (NLMB), the total 
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membership size (MBSIZE), the percentage of female members (FEMALE), and the dummy 
variables (RMARADI, RZINDER, and UZINDER) representing rural credit unions in the Maradi 
and Zinder regions, and urban credit union in the Zinder region, all have the expected signs and are 
significantly related to the amount of mobilized savings deposits. All variables are significant at the 
1 percent level. 
These results indicate that increasing loans to members as is reflected in LSRATIO and 
NLMB will have a positive influence in increasing members deposits. Also, an increase in 
membership size (MBSIZE) naturally leads to a significant increase in savings deposits because all 
CU members are savers first. The female membership (FEMALE) also plays a positive influence 
on the total stock of deposits as expected. Women are known to make small but frequent deposits 
in the CU and to remain net savers in general. Credit unions located in rural areas of Maradi and 
Zinder departments (RMARADI, RZINDER) are shown to generate less savings than those in 
Niamey (the control dummy variable for department). This result is as expected given that Niamey 
is a wealthier area than both Maradi and Zinder. By comparison, UZINDER is shown to generate 
more savings than urban Niamey principally because CUs in Zinder are among the first established 
in the country and have a longer history of a well organized savings mobilization program. 
The results of the loan rationing equation are presented in table 3 and show that all variables 
are statistically significant at either one or 10 percent level. The negative relationship of the stock 
of savings deposits (SAMT) with the loans to savings ratio (LSRATIO) is an indication that the CU 
loan multiple policy does not match the increase in members savings. That is, the maximum loan 
size members can obtain as a multiple of their deposit account balance does not increase to reflect 
the increase in members' deposits, reflecting a very risk averse lending policy. The number of 
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months the CU has been in operation is represented by the AGE variable which is significantly 
negatively related to LSRATIO indicating that CUs in Niger did not exploit their maximum loan 
potential with time. The effective interest rate (INTRA TE) is positive and significant indicating that 
an increase in interest rate does not deter members from applying for loans. This may be an 
indication that these rates are seen as competitive if the member-borrower compares them with 
alternative informal financial rates. Membership size (MBSIZE) and the proportion of female 
members (FEMALE) are positively significantly related to LSRA TI 0 confinning the knowledge that 
more members and especially more female members positively influence the stock of savings which 
consequently increases the number and amount of loans granted. The incentive given to CU 
managers by paying them a salary is shown to be paying off with SALAR YM positively and 
significantly related to LSRATIO. Paid management whose performance is reflected in their salary 
will consequently work hard at mobilizing savings as well as providing members with loans. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has investigated the performance of the CU movement in the Nigerian financial 
markets and found the young movement to be healthy and rapidly growing both in membership as 
well as assets, and deposits. The econometric model results point to several elements that are at the 
core of the growing movement and will affect its future growth. Thus, women appear to be an 
important positive element in savings mobilization. Also, members value highly access to loans 
which potentiality is an incentive for saving with the institution. The use of market rates of interest 
on loans does not seem to deter members from borrowing from the CUs instead of going to the local 
money lender. Using strictly members mobilized savings as loan sources instead of relying on 
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external funds was crucial in determining the long term viability and sustainability of the CUs in 
Niger. 
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Table 1: Description of Variables Used in Regressions 
Variable Description and Measurement Unit Mean Standard 
Deviation 
SAMT Stock of savings deposits in FCF A FCFA 1,312,232 2110361 
LSRATIO Loan to savings ratio FCFA 18.65 28.59 
NLMB Number of loans per member 0.11 0.34 
MBSIZE Average membership size 109.70 72.02 
FEMALE Proportion of female membership in 31.51 35.87 
percent 
RMARADI Dummy for rural Maradi CU 0.15 0.36 
UMARADI Dummy for urban Maradi CU 0.07 0.26 
RZINDER Dummy for rural Zinder CU 0.58 0.49 
UZINDER Dummy for urban Zinder CU 0.08 0.28 
INTRATE Effective interest rate 23.48 25.03 
AGE Number of months the CU has been in 17.39 14.72 
operation 
SALARYM Dummy for paid management 0.43 0.50 
Source: WOCCU/Niger data base. 
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Table 2: 2SLS Estimation Results of the Savings Supply Equation 
Variable Parameter Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
Constant IXo -617667* -1.74 
LSRATIO lXI 13641 ** 2.26 
NLMB IX2 1092762*** 3.21 
MBSIZE IX3 18354*** 12.00 
FEMALE IX4 6511.7*** 2.43 
RMARADI IXs -1517504*** -3.65 
UMARADI a.6 -986677 -0.22 
RZINDER a.7 -899287*** -2.84 
UZINDER IXg 1205284*** 2.76 
R-Square 0.6330 
Adj R-Square 0.6213 
Source: WOCCU-Niger database. 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance a the 10, 5, and 1 present level respectively. 
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Table 3: 2SLS Estimation Results of the Loan Rationing Equation 
Variable Parameter Parameter Estimate t-statistic 
Constant ~0 -9.284411 *** -2.97 
SAMT ~I -0.000004702*** -2.79 
NLMB ~2 17.480172*** 3.74 
MBSIZE ~3 0.132389*** 3.48 
INTRATE p4 0.678425*** 8.30 
AGE Ps -0.209562* -1.83 
SALARYM p6 12.531164*** 3.76 
R-Square 0.5381 
Adj. R-Square 0.5272 
Source: WOCCU/Niger database. 
Note: *,and*** denote significance at the 10 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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